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I.

Introduction

When tapped by the Lincoln Administration at the height of the
American Civil War to help draft what would become a historic
contribution to the development of the law of war, Francis Lieber was
working as a professor.1 It is an aspect of his biography that rarely
figures first in most discussions of Lieber. Lieber is most known for his
authorship of General Orders No. 100, “Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,”2 which set
forth basic rules for the conduct of forces in war. Today, Lieber’s Code
is recognized worldwide for having laid critical groundwork for the
modern law of armed conflict. While falling far short of contemporary
standards for humanitarian protection in war—and arguably tailored
to tolerate just enough violence against civilians to secure the Union’s
advantages in fighting the particular war for which it was drafted—
*

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University,
and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy. This
Article was prepared for a Symposium at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, “The Academy and International Law: A Catalyst for
Change and Innovation.” Thanks are due to Zachary Ramsfelder for his
excellent research assistance.

1.

See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 1 (2012).

2.

Id. at 8.
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there is little question of the significance of Lieber’s contribution to
international law.3 Today, the law of war practice group in the
American Society of International Law rightly bears his name, as does
the center for the study of the law of armed conflict at the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, where students have been instructed in the
terms of the Lieber Code since 1863.4
Yet without for a moment diminishing the significance of his
contributions to law, it is perhaps worth noting in the context of this
Symposium that Lieber’s contributions to education were rather less
noteworthy. As a professor at South Carolina College, where he taught
from 1835 to 1856, “Lieber proved to be a desultory teacher . . . mostly
because he lacked the patience to give his students a chance to get a
word in edgewise.”5 Not exactly the teaching evaluation one aims to
receive. In one sense of course, highlighting such criticism seems unfair.
No human being can excel in every endeavor, and few achieve what
Lieber did in any single effort in a lifetime. Indeed, it was during
Lieber’s tenure at South Carolina that war would begin to divide not
only the country but his own family; one of his sons allied with the
South and later died as a member of the Army of the Confederacy.6 At
the same time, the relative weakness of Lieber’s teaching is a useful
reminder of the complexity of the multifarious roles many academics
have come to play—not only as teachers and authors, but also as
practicing lawyers, consulted experts, and, in the rarer cases, changers
of the world. It is a service that is, at its best, capable of benefitting
the lives of students and citizens alike, as lessons learned in academia
inform the law and policy of States, and vice versa. It also carries no
small measure of risk, and not just to unsatisfied students. Professors
enjoy a measure of professional credibility and knowledge that enables
them to function equally effectively as either constraints on or enablers
of State power. In the two decades since the attacks of September 11,
we have seen ample examples of both.
In many respects, legal academia was caught as flat-footed as
anyone by the events of 9/11. None of the top three American law
schools, for example, had offered courses in National Security Law in

3.

Id. at 3.

4.

Lieber Society on the Law of Armed Conflict, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://
www.asil.org/community/lieber-society-law-armed-conflict [https://perma.
cc/P4J7-WJEX]; About the Lieber Institute, LIEBER INST. W. POINT, https:
//lieber.westpoint.edu/about/lieber/[https://perma.cc/SC25-3CMX].

5.

WITT, supra note 1, at 176.

6.

Id. at 180; see also NIELS EICHHORN, ATLANTIC HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: MIGRATION, TRADE, CONFLICT, AND IDEAS 196–97 (2019).
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the academic year before the attacks.7 But the legal academy saw a
surge of interest in national security and international law among U.S.
students after the attacks, and curricula and course catalogs expanded
to respond.8 Well beyond specialty courses, the rapid developments in
law and policy generated in response to the attacks made it necessary
for even standard law school classes, from civil procedure to
constitutional law, to integrate cases involving foreign relations and
national security.9 Such changes brought with them any number of
positive consequences. Students graduating from U.S. law schools now
are in a far better position to grapple with the mammoth security
challenges facing the United States than lawyers were twenty years ago,
when counsel inside the government and out struggled with what were
novel fields for many. It has been equally encouraging to see civilian
academia more productively engaged with the sprawling American
military and military academy, relationships that had become fraught
since the Vietnam War, effectively limiting vitally important areas of
research and understanding.
Perhaps in part because of academia’s relative unpreparedness in
2001, academics’ effect on legal policy during the post-9/11 wars was a
far more mixed bag.10 As in Lieber’s time, many professors played
pivotal roles in challenging government policies in defense of the law—
representing clients inside government and out; drafting amicus briefs;
helping to inform Congress and members of the press; and writing
broadly, including in popular venues, to analyze and highlight the legal
significance of U.S. actions.11 It is equally possible to identify ways in
which academics played critical roles in efforts to justify or legitimate
legally and morally suspect State behavior. Sometimes this influence
was exercised directly, as, for example, legal counsel to government
officials.12 Often the influence of academics was less direct, as when, for
example, prominent scholars wrote influential pieces defending the
value of torture in interrogation.13 But just measuring the extent to
7.

See Survey of Law School Course Catalogues (1999–2000) (on file with
author).

8.

Id.

9.

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009).

10.

See infra Part III.

11.

See generally Andrew Kent, Constitution and the Laws of War During the
Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–47 (2010).

12.

See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Gen. Couns.,
Off. of Legal Couns. & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Couns., Off. of Legal
Couns., to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns., Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf [https://
perma.cc/53S7-QQAF].

13.

See infra Part III.A.
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which academics advanced or hindered legal development does not fully
capture the range of ways in which legal experts influence State policy.
Among the more challenging critiques levied against those advocating
compliance with international law has been the worry that such efforts,
however well intentioned, in fact functioned to legitimate many of the
most problematic U.S. policies of the era.14 As discussed below, some of
these critiques are unpersuasive. But as a genre, they are worth taking
seriously. For it is now clear that lawyers had a profound impact on
the direction of U.S. counterterrorism operations post-9/11, for better
and worse. Understanding when and why it could be for worse—and
what lessons we should take for academic engagement going forward—
is among this Article’s tasks.
The issue is of no small present moment. A large fraction of
students entering law school today were young children on September
11, 2001. These students have no living memory of, and have had no
necessary exposure to, the shocking pictures of torture from the U.S.
detention facility in Abu Ghraib;15 the harrowing path of U.S. citizen
Jose Padilla, held in military custody for years without access to
counsel;16 or the generational impact of U.S. drone strikes on civilian
populations in and out of conflict zones overseas.17 Yet even now that
the last U.S. combat troops have exited Afghanistan, lawyers must
continue to grapple with the ongoing litigation surrounding U.S.
detention in Guantánamo; military commission trials of accused alQaeda terrorists; a very active debate in Congress about the fate of
still-active authorizations for the use of force; and the growing need to
respond to the threat posed by a different set of terrorists operating

14.

See Former OLC Chief Jack Goldsmith Reflects on Post 9/11 Legal
Opinions, DUKE L. (Nov. 13, 2007), https://law.duke.edu/news/formerolc-chief-jack-goldsmith-reflects-post-911-legal-opinions-1/ [https://perma.
cc/YP9J-AFH9].

15.

Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 5, 2021, 5:55 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scand
al-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/KQD3-GXEL].

16.

Amnesty Int’l, Further Information on UA 166/03 (AMR/084/2003, 11
June 2003): Incommunicado Detention/Detention Without Charge/Legal
Concern, AI Index AMR 51/030/2004 (Feb. 16, 2004).

17.

See Missy Ryan, ‘There Have to Be Limits’: Guantanamo Attorneys
Challenge Lifetime Imprisonment Without Charge, WASH. POST (July 11,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/there-ha
ve-to-be-limits-lawyers-for-guantanamo-inmates-challenge-lifetime-imprison
ment-without-charge/2018/07/11/f3933faa-8533-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_s
tory.html [https://perma.cc/8HLW-VTZL].
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transnationally and domestically.18 The mission of preparing students
to work in these fields is as important as ever.
More broadly still, it is hardly just law-and-security or international
law academics who must grapple with the uncertain real-world impact
of their work. The profound challenges facing democracy in the United
States and around the world test the propriety of adhering to
pedagogical norms of balance and neutrality inside the classroom,
especially in the face of violent or anti-democratic speech outside it. All
legal academics are bound by professional ethical obligations as both
lawyers and teachers. Particularly for those whose work may guide
regulation at the boundary between war and peace, there seems an
additional moral obligation, to avoid making it easier or more likely for
policy makers to act in ways inconsistent with humanitarian or human
rights law. Fulfilling that obligation means ensuring we act in full
awareness of our work’s complex effects.

II. How War Changed the Academy
In the first years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
great orator Cicero gained a popularity likely not experienced by a
Roman statesman for centuries. Cicero’s maxim inter arma silent
leges—commonly translated as “laws fall silent in wartime”—was
invoked repeatedly by scholars, commentators, and federal officials
alike.19 As one prominent American scholar summarized: “It is difficult
to read our constitutional history, however, without believing that the
Constitution is often reduced at best to a whisper during times of
war.”20 Cicero had long since become a favorite of academics interested
18.

See Charlie Savage & Carol Rosenberg, Biden Legal Team Divided on Scope
of Rights of Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/us/politics/biden-rights-guantana
mo-detainees.html [https://perma.cc/SDD6-YST8]; Katherine Ebright, A
Bipartisan Bill to Rein in Presidential War-Making, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/bipartisan-bill-rein-presidential-war-making [https://perma.cc/6P
4U-ZDJQ].

19.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
John A.E. Vervaele, Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the US: Inter Arma Silent
Leges?, 13 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 201 (2005).

20.

Sanford Levinson, What Is the Constitution’s Role in Wartime?, FINDLAW
(Oct. 17, 2001), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/what-isthe-constitutions-role-in-wartime.html [https://perma.cc/AE3J-7QSH]
(“Does law speak in time of war? And, if so, to whom, and how loudly?”).
See also Richard A. Posner, Desperate Times, Desperate Measures, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/24/books/de
s perate-times-desperate-measures.html [https://perma.cc/7JWT-ALAG]
(“Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been at war. It is a war
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in America’s legal response to wars past. By 1998, Cicero’s maxim
earned a place as the final chapter title of then-Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist’s 1998 book, All the Laws but One, which charted the
United States’ imperfect wartime history of protecting otherwise
fundamental rights.21 In the Chief Justice’s estimation, broadly
consistent with then-received academic wisdom, U.S. history showed
that, while laws may not fall “silent” in wartime, they would at least
“speak with a different voice.”22 Indeed, the vast weight of scholarly
opinion in the years preceding 9/11 was that the courts would, as had
been their wont, defer to executive views on all questions of war and
foreign affairs,23 and the executive would, as had been its wont, not
much trouble itself with law regulating war.24
unlike our previous wars, but it is a war nonetheless. War places law under
pressure.”). Less than a week after the attacks, before any assessment of
cause or fault, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt made this clear:
“[W]e’re not going to have all the openness and freedom we have had.”
Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott justified a starker view: “When you’re
at war,” he said, “civil liberties are treated differently.” Charles V. Peña,
What Price Security?, CATO INST. (Sept. 17, 2001), https://www.cato.
org/commentary/what-price-security-0 [https://perma.cc/NT3S-CSZY].
Anticipating the effect of potential future attacks on domestic liberties, the
forecast has been even worse. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Lesser Evils, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (May 2, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/maga
zine/lesser-evils.html [https://perma.cc/DX4M-BUGY] (“Once the zones of
devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves,
in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert, with
sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for
dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our
courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells.”).
21.

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
WARTIME 218–25 (1998).

22.

Id. at 225.

23.

See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 132
(2d ed. 1996) (“[F]oreign affairs make a difference. Here, the courts are less
willing than elsewhere to curb the federal political branches, are even more
disposed to presume the constitutional validity of their actions and to
accept their interpretations of statutes, and have even developed doctrines
of special deference to them.”); Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference,
69 MO. L. REV. 903, 906 & n.14 (citing sources) (2004); Department of
Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism, 107th Cong. 162 (2001) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe,
Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School) (“[C]ourts
necessarily see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer to the
executive’s greater knowledge and expertise.”).

24.

See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (3d. ed. 1995)
(cataloguing examples); HAROLD HONGJUH KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).

THE
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It was perhaps no small irony that lost in Cicero’s service to modern
academia was the reality that his famous inter arma silent leges maxim
had been delivered in his capacity as legal counsel, as part of a defense
oration championing the regular rule of law at a time when the Republic
was collapsing around him.25 Defending his client against a charge of
murder, Cicero had argued the victim had attacked first.26 He was
making an argument grounded in that most basic principle of criminal
law: the ordinary law of murder is silent when arms have already been
raised and the victim acts in self-defense. How Cicero’s defense oration
came to stand for the far broader idea that law is broadly irrelevant (or
at least quieter) in wartime may be lost to history. But by 9/11, the
academic assumption about what was to come for law in the U.S.
response to the attacks was not surprising. Most professors of
international law teaching in the American academy around the turn
of the millennium had themselves attended law school in the 1970s and
early 1980s.27 This was just after the American war in Vietnam during
which U.S. courts indeed had little to say about the war’s legality;28
before the United States ratified the major treaties in international
human rights;29 and before the U.S. Army Field Manual was updated
(after the massacre by U.S. troops of civilians in Vietnam at My Lai)
to describe the main objective of wartime detention operations for the
first time not as the “acquisition of maximum intelligence information,”
but rather, as the “implementation of the Geneva Conventions.”30 Their
25.

CICERO, PRO MILONE 16–17 (G.P. Goold ed., N.H. Watts trans. 1992).

26.

Id. at 17–19.

27.

See e.g., School of Law 2002–2004 Academic Bulletin: Faculty and Staff,
IND. UNIV. BULLETINS, https://bulletins.iu.edu/iub/law/faculty.html [https:
//perma.cc/KR82-CQP5]; UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL FACULTY 2003–2004, at 34 (2003).

28.

See e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1319–20 (1973); United
States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 276 (1970).

29.

Most major international human rights treaties were just beginning to
enter into force in the 1970s. It was not until the 1990s that the United
States ratified treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (in 1992), and the Convention Against Torture (in 1994).
See generally Aulona Haxhiraj, The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 3 JURIDICAL TRIB. 308, 310 (2013); Trent Buatte, The Convention
Against Torture and Non-Refoulement in U.S. Courts, 35 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 701, 704 (2021).

30.

JAMES F. GEBHARDT, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB: U.S. ARMY DETAINEE
DOCTRINE AND EXPERIENCE 44–50 (2005). See also James J. McGowan,
Jr., Training in the Geneva and Hague Conventions: A Dead Issue?,
ARMY LAW. 5 (1974); William Greider, Teaching of War Law Revitalized
by Army, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1971, at A1. For a more detailed
discussion of the evolution of U.S. military doctrine and training
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own law professors had been trained in law before the modern Geneva
Conventions had come into force.31 Law had developed an increasing
amount to say about the regulation of force during their lifetimes, but
it was far from apparent from their own legal education that anyone
was listening.
Academia’s pessimistic certainty about the fate of law in what
would become the post-9/11 wars was no doubt compounded by the
sizable gap that had grown between civilian academia and the U.S.
military over the late twentieth century. Fueled in part by the growing
separation between civilian and military more broadly,32 thousands of
students had come to see graduate education in the 1960s in part as a
mechanism to avoid the draft, a path many teachers and administrators
facilitated in the interest of channeling their own opposition to the
war.33 At the same time, antiwar backlash on college campuses against
students enrolled in Reserve Officers Training Corps (“ROTC”)
programs led many colleges—including almost the entire Ivy League—
to disband or discontinue ROTC programs altogether.34 The separation
was compounded by deeply controversial federal policies in the 1990s
requiring LGBTQ members of the military to remain closeted while in

implementing the Geneva Conventions, see Deborah Pearlstein, Finding
Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention and
Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255 (2006).
31.

Detley Vagts graduated from Harvard Law School in 1951; Louis Henkin
in 1940. See Alumni Focus: Detlev Vagts (1929–2013): Scholar of
International Law and Transnational Law, HARV. L. TODAY (Aug. 21,
2013), https://today.law.harvard.edu/detlev-vagts-1929-2013-scholar-ofinternational-law-and-transnational-law/ [https://perma.cc/Q7BK-Q3Y9];
William Grimes, Louis Henkin, Leader in Field of Human Rights
Law, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com
/2010/10/17/us/17henkin.html [https://perma.cc/Y3PF-CGF9].

32.

See Michael C. Desch, Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization
of the South, and the End of the Mass Army, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS:
THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 289, 292–95
(Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001) (discussing how the
transition from the draft to an all-volunteer military force contributed to
the growing political gap between the military and civilian society); PETER
D. FEAVER & CHRISTOPHER GELPI, CHOOSING YOUR BATTLES: AMERICAN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE 5 (2004).

33.

Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, The Draft and Who Escaped It,
in LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL: A VIETNAM WAR ANTHOLOGY 460–
65 (Andrew J. Rotter ed., 1991).

34.

Emma Moore & Andrew Swick, Leveraging ROTC to Span the CivilMilitary Gap, CTR. FOR NEW AM. SEC. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cnas
.org/publications/reports/working-paper-leveraging-rotc-to-span-the-civilmilitary-gap [https://perma.cc/6FGM-M2KJ].

178

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
What War Did to the Academy, What the Academy Did to War: A 20-Year
Retrospective on the Effects of the Post-9/11 Wars

service, and to require universities accepting federal funding to allow
military recruiters on campus.35
Yet even as American litigation and scholarship surrounding the
law regulating war began to grow dramatically in the wake of
Vietnam36—including the production of the first law school casebook
expressly devoted to national security, foreign relations law, and the
law of armed conflict37—law school course offerings in national security
law, the law of armed conflict, and the use of force remained relatively
sparse even among the top twenty U.S. law schools.38 Neither Harvard,
Yale, nor Stanford offered a course in national security law during the
1999–2000 academic year.39 That school year, only one of the twelve
schools from which we obtained course records offered a stand-alone
course in the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law.40
So it was perhaps unsurprising that on September 12, 2001, as the
United States embarked upon a mammoth global war effort that would
span more than two decades, the Chief Legal Advisor to the National
Security Council at the White House (later a State Department Legal
Adviser) was a distinguished government attorney who had never taken
a course in international law.41 He was far from alone. While it may
never be possible to disentangle fully which aspects of the deeply
problematic post-9/11 U.S. detention, interrogation, trial, and use-offorce policies were driven by design and which (at least in part) by
35.

Id.; see also Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., 547 U.S. 47 (2006).

36.

Peter Raven-Hansen et al., A Brief History of the Field of National Security
Law, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: FIFTY YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION 33
(2012).

37.

Id. at 34–35 (citing DONALD N. ZILLMAN, THE MILITARY
SOCIETY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1978)).

38.

In preparing this Article, the author solicited course catalogues from the
top twenty American law schools as listed in the U.S. News & World Report
rankings for 1999–2000 and 2014–2015. The author included courses that
covered international law, national security law, pressing geopolitical issues,
or implicated contingencies of the “War on Terror.” Some schools were only
able to provide catalogues for earlier or later years. See e.g., Course
Catalogues for Yale Law School (1999–2000 & 2014–2015) (on file with
author).

39.

Course Catalogues for Yale Law School, Harvard Law School, and
Stanford Law School (1999–2000) (on file with author).

40.

Harvard offered a course called “War/International Humanitarian Law:
Norms, Crimes, and Institutions” in the 1999–2000 term. Course
Catalogue for Harvard Law School (1999–2000) (on file with author).

41.

Former Bush Administration National Security Council and State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger has remarked that he did not take
a course in International Law while a student at Harvard Law School. An
Interview with John Bellinger III, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. – ONLINE 32 (2010).
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ignorance,42 a qualitative survey of senior national security policy
officials who served in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama
Administrations between 2001–2019 suggests that fluency in even basic
pillars of international law among this group during the post-9/11 era
was more of an exception than a rule.43 Consider one example: The legal
obligation for United Nations Member States to seek U.N. Security
Council authorization for the use of military force under certain
circumstances is set forth in the first instance in the U.N. Charter, a
treaty signed and ratified by the United States in 1945.44 While many
aspects of the Charter framework, including the role of the U.N.
Security Council, have been the subject of decades-long debate,45 there
42.

The literature documenting the development and implementation of these
programs is rich and deep. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007);
JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); CHARLIE SAVAGE,
TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE:
THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY (2012).

43.

The study and its implications are discussed in detail in Deborah
Pearlstein, Lawyering the Presidency, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3808071
[https://perma.cc/Q4LY-8LUL].

44.

U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (prohibiting “the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state”); see also U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”).

45.

Indeed, the vitality of the U.N. Charter Art. 2(4) prohibition on the use of
force against the territory of another sovereign without their consent has
long been the subject of (to put it mildly) doubt, the rule’s “demise” having
been reported on multiple occasions since rumors of its death first emerged
half a century ago. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The U.S. Ignores the U.N. Charter
Because It’s Broken, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2013), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2013/09/the-u-n-charter-is-broken-what-should-replace-it.html
[https://perma.cc/T9JF-H6CR]; Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article
2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governed the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J.
INT’L L. 809 (1970) (“[T]oday the high-minded resolve of Article 2(4) mocks
us from its grave.”). These declarations have appeared especially compelling
in recent years in light of a series of high-profile violations of the Charter
prohibition. See, e.g., Claus Kress, On the Principle of Non-Use of Force
in Current International Law, JUST SEC. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.
justsecurity.org/66372/on-the-principle-of-non-use-of-force-in-current-int
ernational-law/ [https://perma.cc/J9PB-LXY6] (noting, among others,
the Russian annexation of Crimea and the Israeli annexation of the Golan).
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is strong legal consensus surrounding, at a minimum, the basic
framework: States must seek U.N. Security Council authorization to
use armed force against another State unless the target State consents,
or unless the attacking State is acting in national self-defense.46 But in
discussions of officials’ normative beliefs about the role of the U.N.
Security Council, just four of the sixteen officials who sat for oral
interviews with the author evinced any working knowledge of this basic
legal framework, including its relationship to the U.N. Charter.47 A
substantial majority rather expressed significant uncertainty about or
misapprehension of the Charter scheme.48 As one emphasized: “Nowhere
can I recall seeing a document that a nation has to go to the U.N.
Security Council.”49
It is thus perhaps one of the great ironies—and great
achievements—of the post-9/11 era that, by any number of available
metrics, the attacks of 9/11, and the sweeping changes in
counterterrorism policy and practice that ensued, transformed the
study of international and national security law in the U.S. legal
academy. By 2012, more than 125 law schools in the United States had
stand-alone courses in national security law, not including related
courses in subjects like counterterrorism law or intelligence law, and
scholars had produced at least five different law school casebooks on
the subject.50 In the survey of law school course offerings described
above, schools offered ninety-one courses in international law, human
rights law, or national security law in the years just before 9/11; fifteen
years later, that number had risen to 147.51 Indeed, merely focusing on
the growth of entire courses devoted to these topics undoubtedly
underestimates the curricular impact of these issues, as constitutional
law professors added landmark Supreme Court cases like Hamdan v.

But see id. (“The ‘cornerstone’ of international law is as stable today as it
was in 1970. But it remains surrounded by a grey area.”).
46.

Pearlstein, supra note 43 (manuscript at 27–28).

47.

Id. (describing total survey pool).

48.

Id. While the four knowledgeable interviewees had all attended law school
at some point, it is worth noting that most U.S. law schools do not require
a general course in international law, and even students who take it may
not have delved into detailed questions about U.N. Charter application.

49.

Id. at 28, n.118. (quoting Interview 7); see also id. (quoting Interview 9:
“Dean Acheson would’ve gone ape” if he thought the Charter required
the United States to get “UN permission to act on behalf of our own
national interests.”).

50.

Raven-Hansen et al., supra note 36, at 31.

51.

See Survey of Law School Course Catalogues, supra note 7.
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Rumsfeld 52 and Boumediene v. Bush53 to their syllabi; civil procedure
professors added Ashcroft v. Iqbal 54 and Clapper v. Amnesty
International;55 and criminal law and First Amendment professors
added Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder.56 For better or worse, cases
posing core questions of international law and security became staple
features of the docket of the U.S. federal courts in the decade following
the attacks, and they were accordingly all but impossible to avoid for
American law students.
Scholarship on post-9/11 law and security topics likewise witnessed
an explosion in growth. Between 1980–2000, for example, there were
278 published articles in academic legal journals mentioning the U.S.
Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay.57 Between 2001–2021, there were
7,588.58 Neither was scholarly attention devoted solely to the domestic
law implications of U.S. counterterrorism operations. Between 1980–
2000, there were roughly 2,108 legal academic articles published
referencing the Geneva Conventions in some way.59 In the twenty years
52.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). See generally Raven-Hansen
et al., supra note 36, at 36 (noting that the new war generated a series of
“blockbuster” national security law opinions).

53.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

54.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

55.

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).

56.

Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).

57.

278 Search Results for the Term “Guantánamo” Between Jan. 1, 1980
and Dec. 31, 2000, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.h
tml?query=guantanamo&jurisdiction=NY-CS-ALL&contentType=ANALY
TICAL&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aee0000017fd81ed3ce0423b8b7&searc
hId=i0ad73aa70000017b41381ca4ec7b159e&transitionType=ListViewType&
contextData=(sc.Search) (enter “Guantánamo” in the search box; then filter
by “Law Review & Journal” in Publication Type; then indicate “01/01/1980
– 12/31/2000” in Date Range) (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).

58.

7588 Search Results for the Term “Guantánamo” Between Sept. 11, 2001
and Dec. 31, 2021, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.h
tml?query=guantanamo&jurisdiction=NY-CS-ALL&contentType=ANALY
TICAL&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aee0000017fd827ffa80424af67&search
Id=i0ad62aee0000017fd82727096c752baa&transitionType=ListViewType&c
ontextData=(sc.Search) (enter “Guantánamo” in the search box; then filter
by “Law Review & Journal” in Publication Type; then indicate “09/11/2001
– 12/31/2021” in Date Range) (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).

59.

2108 Search Results for the Term “Geneva Convention” Between Jan. 1,
1980 and Dec. 31, 2000, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/Res
ults.html?query=geneva%20convention&jurisdiction=NY-CS-ALL&content
Type=ANALYTICAL&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aee0000017fd82468d6
04243e29&searchId=i0aa62aee0000017fd823aee26c752902&transitionType=
ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (enter “Geneva Convention” in the
search box; then filter by “Law Review & Journal” in Publication Type; then
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since 9/11, there have been more than three times that number.60 The
scholarly study of international law, in particular, witnessed a
revolutionary turn to the empirical, bringing new understanding to the
ways in which different structural mechanisms or incentives—from
courts and other institutional actors and organizations,61 to domestic
politics and sociology62—influence state decision-making in the real
world.63 And even those numbers cannot capture the breadth of
academic engagement through popular publications and newly formed

indicate “01/01/1980 – 12/31/2000” in Date Range) (last visited Mar. 30,
2022).
60.

6384 Search Results for the Terms “Geneva Conventions” Between Sept.
11, 2001 and Dec. 31, 2021, WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Search/
Results.html?query=geneva%20convention&jurisdiction=NY-CS-ALL&cont
entType=ANALYTICAL&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad62aee0000017fd8267
05b04248e30&searchId=i0aa62aee0000017fd823aee26c752902&transitionTyp
e=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (enter “Geneva Convention” in
the search box; then filter by “Law Review & Journal” in Publication Type;
then indicate “09/11/2001 – 12/31/2021” in Date Range) (last visited Mar.
30, 2022).

61.

See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative
Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45
(2009) (reporting findings from meetings with former State Department
Legal Advisers); Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield:
An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2010) (reporting findings from interviews with JAG lawyers); see also
KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001) (attributing
domestic government compliance with European Court of Justice rulings to
concerns about political legitimacy).

62.

See, e.g., Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 273 (2010) (examining the role of domestic political constituencies
in promoting compliance with international human rights law); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (positing a
sociology of State influence on other States).

63.

For useful reviews of the field of empirical study, see Emilie M. HafnerBurton et al., Political Science Research on International Law: The State of
the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 91 (2012); Gregory Shaffer & Tom
Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010) (summarizing compliance literature). See
also Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal
Decision Making, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359 (2013); Ashley Deeks, The
Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and
Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (2013) (assembling a set of
recent examples in which the executive has changed or amended national
security policies, changes motivated by the mere prospect that judicial
engagement might call the policy’s legality into question).
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and quickly influential blogs.64 Multiple law schools established new
centers devoted to research and debate,65 created new specialty journals
focused on national security and international law,66 and began offering
training courses for non-students in the law of war or related subjects.67
By the end of the first decade after 9/11, the civilian academy’s
sweeping embrace of matters of law and war was coupled with
encouraging signs of steps to begin closing the civil-military gap that
compromised the quality of these studies in the decades leading up to
the attacks. In part, the partial re-integration of civilian and military
study was visible in the rapidly increasing population of U.S. military
veterans, many of whom returned from the post-9/11 wars to enroll in
higher education, aided by the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act of 2008 and related federal programs.68 When federal
education aid for veterans initially capped tuition aid to top private
law schools, Stanford, New York University, Columbia, and other law
schools took steps to provide supplemental aid to boost enrollment
among former members of the armed forces.69 In less direct, but
nonetheless important, ways, academics took advantage of countless
cooperative programs and conferences co-sponsored by both civilian and
military academic hosts.70 And military veterans joined the civilian
64.

See, e.g., OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/ [https://perma.cc/UC64M6V7]; LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ [https://perma.cc/5T
JC-BCXM]; JUST SEC., https://www.justsecurity.org/ [https://perma.cc
/ZHU6-LDSU].

65.

See, e.g., Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, HARV. L.
SCH., https://pilac.law.harvard.edu/#core-team-home [https://perma.cc
/DS4U-VSG2]; Lieber Institute, W. POINT, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/
[https://perma.cc/YCX6-B664].

66.

See, e.g., NAT’L SEC. L.J.; J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y.

67.

See, e.g., War Crimes and Atrocity Law, U. VA. L. SCH., https://www.law.
virginia.edu/courses/view/122218605 [https://perma.cc/U6UX-HNER].

68.

Veterans Education and the GI Bill, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
https://www.acenet.edu/Policy-Advocacy/Pages/Other-Issues/Veterans
-Education-GI-Bill.aspx [https://perma.cc/6R3G-26V8].

69.

Mary Carmichael, ROTC Back at Harvard After 40 Years, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 21, 2011, 3:53 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/09/
20/after-year-standoff-harvard-makes-peace-with-naval-rotc/4haBwUhNJC
Anqb4LR4wZbI/story.html [https://perma.cc/D5GU-SY3T] (summarizing
Harvard’s relationship with ROTC following the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,” the federal policy that required gay and lesbian service members to
keep their sexual preferences quiet or face expulsion); see also Christina
Pazzanese, Higher Education and the Military, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr.
14, 2016), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/04/higher-educati
on-and-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/VCM7-FCK5].

70.

See e.g., About the Lieber Institute, supra note 4 (noting the Lieber Institute
academic center and cooperative programs at West Point).
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academy as professors as well: today, U.S. law students from California
to Texas to Massachusetts can take international law from professors
who had previous careers as military lawyers.71
Perhaps most important, while a world of disagreement remains
about the effectiveness of legal constraints on violations of domestic
and international law in U.S. counterterrorism operations post 9/11,72
the notion that law will simply fall silent in time of war today appears
to have remarkably few (if any) academic adherents. In addition to the
staggering increase in volume of scholarship about domestic and
international law in times of armed conflict, it has become increasingly
common to find recognition of, as some authors described it, the
“normalization of foreign relations law” in the United States—the view
that courts have become increasingly comfortable engaging in questions
of law in this realm.73 Academics who have served as government
lawyers in the past two decades have documented the extent to which
domestic and international law regulating war influences, shapes, and
indeed at times constrains decision-making by U.S. policy makers.74
Rather than denying the impact of law and lawyers on government
decision-making, scholars in recent years have emphasized the
important influence of government lawyers in this realm, coupled most
recently with an uptick in calls to reform those roles to ensure they
function more to limit than expand the substantive scope of presidential
71.

See e.g., Geoff Corn, S. TEXAS COLL. L., https://www.stcl.edu/about-us
/faculty/geoffrey-s-corn/ [https://perma.cc/TDB3-8G54]; John Dehn,
LOY. CHI. SCH. L., https://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/facultyandadminist
rationprofiles/dehn-john.shtml [https://perma.cc/E4WE-WNCN]; Rachel
VanLandingham, SOUTHWESTERN UNIV., https://www.swlaw.edu/faculty
/full-time/rachel-e-vanlandingham [https://perma.cc/8U33-LZTS]; Gaby
Blum, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10089/
Blum [https://perma.cc/5TBU-C92C].

72.

Compare JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 208 (2012) (arguing “never before has the
Commander in Chief been so influenced, and constrained, by law”), with
RICHARD ABEL, LAW’S WARS: THE FATE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE U.S.
“WAR ON TERROR” 682 (2018) (“[D]efenders of the rule of law achieved
only partial victories—all that is ever possible.”). See also Shirin Sinnar,
Rule of Law Tropes, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566 (2016).

73.

Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015); see also Harlan Grant
Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law,
2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1467 (2015); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference:
Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 783 (2011).

74.

See generally GOLDSMITH, supra note 72; Ingber, supra note 63, at 359;
Deeks, supra note 63, at 827 (assembling a set of recent examples in which
the executive has changed or amended national security policies, motivated
by the prospect that the judiciary might challenge their legality).
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power in particular.75 Given this relative renaissance in scholarly
thought, and the curricular changes in legal education noted above,
there is some cause for optimism that the coming generation of
government counsel will be better prepared to answer complex
questions of law in the field than their counterparts were in 2001.
At the same time, that optimism comes with a critical caveat. It is
far from certain that academia’s vigorous post-9/11 commitment to the
study and teaching of national security and international law is either
particularly deep, or likely to endure. Today, only a handful of
American law schools require students to complete any course in
international law, and roughly one fifth of U.S. law schools do not offer
the course on an annual basis.76 Likewise, few of the top five U.S.
graduate programs in international affairs and foreign policy (the
graduates of which regularly go on to senior positions in government
policy) require even a basic introductory course in international law.77
And for those students who do enroll in international legal studies in
law school, they are still likely to encounter a casebook that cites
principally to opinions of U.S. courts.78 While that choice by U.S.
casebook authors is understandable in some respects, it makes it more
likely that senior lawyers serving in U.S. government are unfamiliar
with the primary European courts whose rulings on privacy and
surveillance (among other things) have already had a significant impact

75.

See generally Pearlstein, supra note 43; Emily Berman, Weaponizing the
Office of Legal Counsel, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 515 (2021); Oona Hathaway,
National Security Lawyering in the Post-War Era: Can Law Constrain
Power?, 68 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (2021).

76.

Ryan Scoville & Milan Markovic, How Cosmopolitan are International
Law Professors?, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 119 (2016) (citing Country: United
States, PILMAP (2014), http://pilmap.org/Details/US [https://perma.cc
/A2E4-DXA3], which reports that only 4% of U.S. law schools require
students to complete a course on international law).

77.

See The Best International Relations Schools in the World, FOREIGN
POL’Y (2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/top-fifty-schoolsinternational-relations-foreign-policy/ [https://perma.cc/P64V-EAEP].
Foreign Policy Magazine, in collaboration with the Teaching, Research,
and International Policy (“TRIP”) project at the College of William and
Mary, publishes a regular ranking of international relations and foreign
policy masters and PhD programs. The latest edition, released in 2018,
ranks Columbia University’s programs, for instance, in the top five schools
for international relations across the two graduate categories. However,
its Masters of International Affairs program does not include international
law as a core or required class. See Master of International Affairs (MIA):
MIA Core Curriculum, COLUM. SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFF., https://bullet
in.columbia.edu/sipa/programs/mia/#requirementstext [https://perma.cc/
66GP-53HY].

78.

ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 146 (2017).
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on U.S. government and business alike.79 And then there is the necessity
of sustaining interest in the field once these issues are no longer quite
so chronically front page news. As a Red Cross survey conducted a
decade after 9/11 found, roughly half of American students between
the ages of twelve and seventeen reported never having heard of the
Geneva Conventions or international humanitarian law.80 Whether the
changes in the academy wrought by the post-9/11 wars will last long
enough to benefit these students and their successors, it may yet be too
soon to tell.

III. How the Academy Changed the War
If the post-9/11 wars have been, at least to an extent, a significant
boon to the study and teaching of law in related fields, the academy’s
effect on the course of the war has been a far more mixed bag. Perhaps
in part as a result of the United States’ general unpreparedness for the
attacks or the legal issues arising out of the U.S. response, legal
academics were able to have a remarkable impact during the past
twenty years in shaping the U.S. response. Some of these contributions
unquestionably helped to promote U.S. adherence to legal obligations.
Notably, law professors took the lead in key cases challenging the
military detention, treatment, and trial of terrorist suspects under
domestic and international law;81 consulted on the drafting of
legislation; and wrote detailed analyses essential in helping the press,
policy makers, and public understand the sweeping legal implications
of government positions.82
At the same time, it is equally possible to identify prominent
academics who helped to excuse or justify legally and morally suspect
79.

Deborah Pearlstein, For Facebook’s Sake: Getting Conversant with
Human Rights, JUST SEC. (June 10, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org
/76840/for-facebooks-sake-getting-conversant-with-human-rights/ [https:
//perma.cc/K3L4-VZTB].

80.

Red Cross Survey Finds Young Americans Unaware of the Rules of War,
CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 11, 2011, 10:00 ET), https://www.prnewswi
re.com/news-releases/red-cross-survey-finds-young-americans-unawareof-rules-of-war-119689069.html [https://perma.cc/KBJ7-4YG5].

81.

Neal Katyal, of Georgetown Law School, led the litigation challenging the
legality of military commission trials all the way to the Supreme Court.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). Jenny Martinez, of Stanford
Law School, led efforts to challenge the designation of U.S. citizen Jose
Padilla as an “enemy combatant,” again culminating in oral arguments in
the Supreme Court. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Alex Reinert,
of Cardozo Law School, litigated Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 665 (2009).

82.

See, e.g., Martin Lederman, Understanding the OLC Torture Memos,
BALKINIZATION (Jan. 7, 2005), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/unde
rstanding-olc-torture-memos-part.html [https://perma.cc/M6UU-6EYB].
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U.S. behavior during this period. Perhaps most well-known is the work
of law professor John Yoo, who, as a lawyer in the Justice Department
Office of Legal Counsel, authored a profoundly flawed memorandum
endorsing the President’s authority to ignore statutory and
international law prohibitions against torture in authorizing “enhanced
interrogation techniques” against terrorist suspects.83 And Yoo was
hardly alone among academics prepared to embrace torture,84 or to
advance other sweeping claims of executive power post 9/11.85
Our professional and moral responsibility as scholars make it
necessary to take account of both forms of academic influence,
particularly if it helps to identify ways of improving our performance
in the future. As it turns out, experiences of the post-9/11 era have
exposed not only the direct means, but also the more subtle mechanisms
through which legal academics and lawyers influence State decisionmaking. Indeed, one of the most challenging critiques levied against
lawyers who measured U.S. actions by their compliance with
international law has been the worry that such efforts, however wellintentioned, in fact functioned to legitimate many of the most
problematic post-9/11 U.S. policies in warfighting. Examining whether
these or other critiques are valid sheds light both on the complexity of
the multifarious roles many academics have come to play in driving
States’ legal development, and on the role of legal expertise in policy
decision-making more broadly.
A. Law as Justification

It is unfortunately easy to find examples in history of academics
whose scholarly contributions became, intentionally or not, fodder for
political leaders to excuse or justify as legal policies better understood
as radically inconsistent with prevailing law.86 So, too, after 9/11. At
83.

84.

Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Gen. Couns., Off. of Legal
Couns., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Couns. to the President, Untitled
Letter Re: “Enhanced Interrogation” (Aug. 1, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gw
u.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/020801.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRX3-J2BM]
[hereinafter Yoo Torture Memo]; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Couns. to the
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.washington post.com/wp
-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6CUQ-VZPT] [hereinafter Bybee Torture Memo].
See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).

THE

85.

See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).

86.

See Sanford Levinson, Torture in Iraq & the Rule of Law in America, 133
DAEDALUS 5, 7–9 (2004) (discussing Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt’s
influence on the Bush Administration).
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roughly the same time that Berkeley Law Professor John Yoo, as a
newly-installed attorney in the Justice Department Office of Legal
Counsel, was penning his then-confidential memo absolving the
President of any need to comply with domestic or international laws
prohibiting torture,87 Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz
was preparing to publish his provocative book, Why Terrorism Works:
Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge.88 Dershowitz
argued, among other things, that Congress should craft legislation to
accommodate the need to use torture in case the government were to
detain a suspect it believed had vital knowledge of the location or status
of a “ticking bomb.”89 In Dershowitz’s vision, courts could be
empowered to issue judicial “torture warrants” authorizing a
predetermined amount of non-lethal pressure—“say, a sterilized needle
inserted under the fingernails to produce unbearable pain without any
threat to health or life.”90 Dershowitz saw “the simple cost-benefit
analysis for employing such non-lethal torture” as “overwhelming.”91 In
his eyes, it was “surely better to inflict non-lethal pain on one guilty
terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to prevent an
act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent victims to
die.”92 Neither domestic nor international law need pose an obstacle to
the proposal, Dershowitz maintained.93 Because the U.S. Constitution
could be read not to prohibit the use of physical force to “obtain
information needed to save lives,” and because the United States had
consented to be bound by the Convention Against Torture only to the
extent the torture it barred was also prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution, the United States could use torture in such cases and
“arguably remain in technical compliance with its treaty obligation.”94
For some, the national security imperative of counterterrorism post
9/11 furnished an occasion to operationalize theories of international
law and executive power they had championed to lesser effect before
87.

Yoo Torture Memo, supra note 83.

88.

DERSHOWITZ, supra note 84. For a summary of the legal flaws with the
argument that Dershowitz and the Bush Administration embraced with
respect to U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture, see Sarah
Cleveland, The United States and the Torture Convention, Part I:
Extraterritoriality, JUST SEC. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org
/17435/united-states-torture-convention-part-i-extraterritoriality/ [https://
perma.cc/L68A-3UE4].

89.

See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 84, at 142–45.

90.

Id. at 141, 144.

91.

Id. at 144.

92.

Id.

93.

See id. at 136.

94.

Id.
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the attacks.95 Others entered the post-9/11 wars without preconceptions
on specific questions of law or security, but ended up embracing new
understandings of legal rules and institutions that justified weaker legal
constraints on government power in the name of national security.96 In
either form, the work of these scholars had the effect of helping to
justify the United States’ position that existing legal structures
supported its practices of, for example, torture and global surveillance,
and, likewise supported the limited jurisdiction of courts to review the
interrogation, detention, and trial of terrorism suspects.97 Yet, while
scholars’ ordinary professional obligations to research and write in
depth and with rigor should seem especially pressing when advancing
arguments that support claims to extraordinary power, in too much of
the post-9/11 literature, scholars fell notably short. For, despite many
of these scholars’ chronic, self-effacing claims of only modest knowledge
in matters of security policy,98 they leveraged their status as experts to
95.

See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as Supreme Law of the Land, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2095 (1999) (reviewing John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1955, 1959 (1999)); see also ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
TERROR IN THE BALANCE 56 (2007).

96.

See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 3–4, 13 (2006); PHILIP B.
HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, THE LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY
PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS IN THE
WAR ON TERRORISM 9 (2014) (“It is the President who has the information
and expertise necessary to detect and infiltrate terrorist networks and
incapacitate terrorists. Having outsiders second-guessing these steps would
inevitably lead to undue executive branch caution . . . Courts, legislatures
and even Inspectors General undermine confidence, move much too slowly
and need information that they cannot safely be given. Oversight of
executive actions, therefore, should lie exclusively within the operating arms
of the executive branch.”).

97.

See, e.g., Bybee Torture Memo, supra note 83, at 36–37 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961), “As Hamilton explained, . . . ‘there can be no limitation of that
authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the
community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.’”); OFF. OF THE ATT’Y
GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE
PRESIDENT 6–7, 13–15 (Jan. 19, 2006) (“Because of the structural
advantages of the Executive Branch, the Founders also intended that the
President would have the primary responsibility and necessary authority
as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the Nation and to
conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”).

98.

See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 95, at 6–7 (“We emphasize
that, as lawyers we do not have any expertise regarding optimal security
policy.”); DERSHOWITZ, supra note 84, at 13 (“This book is . . . from the
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make repeated, substantive, yet unsupported claims about the policy
necessity of the structural legal arrangements they endorsed. One
example: a major terrorist attack will generate “mass panic,”
undermining “effective sovereignty,” and requiring visibly different
security measures (such as widespread detention) to reassure the
population.99 (Social science literature at the time provided substantial
evidence illustrating that “widespread panic is not the pattern following
any type of disaster.”)100 Another example: inadequate detention (or
excessive judicial review) would give “aid and comfort” to our terrorist
enemies; further, the uncertainty created by requiring judicial review of
such detention imposes a burden on security efforts that exceeds any
security benefit.101 (As multiple accounts by military officers and
personnel made apparent, America’s legally problematic detention
policy was a singular boon to our enemies’ efforts in recruitment.)102

perspective of a defense lawyer and a professor of criminal law and a
student of psychology . . . I do not claim the dubious mantle of ‘expert’ on
the broad issue of terrorism.”); JOHN C. YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS xi
(2006) (“I did not expect to be involved in many important decisions. My
field of research and writing in the university world was war . . . I had not
expected to be too busy because the Bush Justice Department . . . focused
primarily on a domestic agenda.”).
99.

ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 41–45, 89.

100. LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE 179 n.54 (1999) (“The pattern, in fact,
is one of terror, accompanied by a moment of stunned reflection, or even
anomie, followed by fairly orderly response. Even in the horrors chronicled
by the [U.S.] Strategic Bombing Survey [established in 1944 to study the
effects on cities in World War II devastated by firestorms and, later, nuclear
attacks], cities burn, bodies explode, houses fall down and still people do
not panic.”) (citations omitted). See also Lee Clarke, Panic: Myth or
Reality?, 2022 CONTEXTS 21, 22 (“After five decades studying scores of
disasters . . . one of the strongest findings is that people rarely lose
control.”); E.L. Quarantelli, Sociology of Panic, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 11020, 11021 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds.,
2001) (discussing that some researchers believe that panic behavior “is very
meaningful and far from most conceptions of irrationality”); Kathleen
Tierney, Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster
Myths in the Aftermath of 9/11, in 11 RSCH. IN SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y
33, 34 (Lee Clarke ed., 2003) (suggesting that notion of widespread panic
after disaster is a “myth”); ALAN O’DAY, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND TERRORISM (2004).
101. ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 45–47; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note
95, at 254–56; YOO, supra note 98, at 128–29 (2006).
102. Matthew Alexander, I’m Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq, WASH.
POST (Nov. 30, 2008), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/11/28/AR2008112802242.html [https://perma.cc/3K96-26UX]
(“I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to
fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”).
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Yet while it is easy to criticize this form of academic justification,
it is less clear how best to guard against its dangers going forward.
Scholars’ right to raise challenging arguments that force a
reconsideration of prevailing norms is, of course, the very essence of
academic freedom. Most of this work fell squarely within that tradition,
one essential to preserving liberal democracy. At the same time, it
should be possible to bolster external mechanisms capable of mitigating
the real-world impact of unethical or baseless academic claims. To the
extent scholars are acting as practicing lawyers (whether or not in
government), more robust policing of legal ethics rules could help steer
them away from claims that violate core rules of the legal profession.103
To the extent scholars are publishing their work in scholarly venues,
more rigorous publisher attention to peer review, including as part of
the process of student-edited law reviews, could help achieve similar
ends for work lacking empirical support. Policy makers at times have
no choice but to make difficult decisions quickly based on incomplete
information. Academics, as a general matter, rarely face the same time
constraints. It should be harder for scholars to claim the mantle of
expertise and to insist upon their substantive ignorance at the same
time. Authors, editors, ethicists, and publishers can do an invaluable
service to law and policy by making sure their professors have done
their homework first.
B. Law as Legitimation

Dissenting from the Supreme Court’s infamous decision in
Korematsu v. United States, in which the Court upheld the exclusion
of Japanese-American citizens from their homes in a vast military area
on the West Coast, Justice Jackson warned that the Court’s ratification
of the military’s order was in some respects more dangerous than the
order itself:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the
promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military
emergency . . . But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an
order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution
sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of
103. There are also a number of reforms that might be pursued to enhance the
quality of advice by government legal counsel in particular. See, e.g.,
Pearlstein, supra note 43 (manuscript at 45–46); Emily Berman,
Weaponizing the Office of Legal Counsel, 62 B.C. L. REV. (2021); ANNIE L.
OWENS, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, REFORMING THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL:
LIVING UP TO ITS BEST PRACTICES (2020).
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transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like
a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.104

Jackson warned about the dangers of legal legitimation—the prospect
that post hoc judicial approval, or perhaps even mere judicial
engagement, might succeed in normalizing conduct otherwise better
marginalized as exceptional.105
In the post-9/11 era, multiple scholars raised concerns that efforts
by academics and advocates to embrace international law, in
challenging many of the most problematic aspects of U.S.
counterterrorism policy, paradoxically produced a similarly legitimating
effect. Writing with the benefit of his own experience in both academia
and government (as head of the Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–
2004), Jack Goldsmith argued that the raft of “best-selling books,
reports, blog posts,” and lawsuits challenging the legality of post-9/11
policies managed only “to uncover, challenge, change, and then
effectively approve nearly every element of the Bush counterterrorism
program.”106 Yes, Goldsmith argued, all that work had persuaded
Congress and the courts to add some “restrictions and accountability
strings” to existing counterterrorism policies, but in the end had really
only succeeded in codifying the basic outlines of the original program.107
Rebecca Ingber raised similar concerns, suggesting that the availability
of international legal arguments in support of some aspects of executive
policy (like wartime detention) made it easier for the executive to
continue policies with weaker rights protections than those available
under domestic law because of the assumption that executive
compliance with international law ensured at least a minimum set of
institutional checks and international support.108 Samuel Moyn has
recently taken such legitimation concerns even further. He maintains
104. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., id.
106. GOLDSMITH, supra note 72, at xi–xii (2012).
107. Id. at xii–xiv.
108. Rebecca Ingber, International Law Constraints as Executive Power, 57
HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 96, 99–101 (2016). Ingber highlights the continuation
of military detention policies for terrorist suspects, even U.S. citizens, for
years after 9/11. She notes that organizations, such as the ACLU, declined
to take the position in briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court that indefinite
military detention of a U.S. citizen was necessarily a violation of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 99 (citing Brief Submitted on Behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (No. 02-7338), 2002 WL 33962810, at 27–29). See also Brief for the
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
11a–14a, 20a–21a, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
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that efforts by academics and non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) to demand compliance with international laws regulating the
conduct of war effectively prolonged the war’s duration, either by
tamping down popular resistance that would otherwise have given rise
to a greater push for ending war by the American people, or by giving
President Obama and members of his Administration some degree of
moral or psychological comfort in their actions that helped them
rationalize their role in the continued use of military force.109
There can be little question that even the most rigorous, good faith
scholarship or advocacy can have unintended consequences, even
consequences that are the opposite of one’s intent. While there is surely
a vast moral and ethical difference between lawyers and scholars who
advance profoundly flawed or unethical legal arguments in the interest
of supporting a favored policy, and lawyers and scholars who advance
legally sound arguments to uncertain ends, all should be self-conscious
about the range of effects a seemingly straightforward legal analysis can
have. Indeed, if arguments like Moyn’s were substantiated, it should
lead proponents of the legal regulation of war, both inside academia
and out, to a fundamental reassessment of the project of international
humanitarian law.
Yet concerns about the legitimating effect of legal arguments
advanced outside the courts are far easier to raise than prove. There
remains significant room, for example, for good faith disagreement
about the accuracy of Goldsmith’s assessment of recent history. He is,
of course, correct that Congress ultimately codified the Supreme
Court’s view in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,110 holding that a 2001 statute
authorized the use of military detention for members of al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and associated forces, so long as those detentions complied
with baseline standards under international law.111 Indeed, the 2001
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) and associated
codifications remain on the books today—and the subject of growing
and increasingly bipartisan criticism on Capitol Hill.112 On the other
hand, dismissing the effect of Hamdi and subsequent developments as
109. SAMUEL MOYN, HUMANE: HOW THE UNITED STATES ABANDONED PEACE AND
REINVENTED WAR (2021).
110. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
111. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2, 115 Stat.
224–25 (2001); 18 U.S.C. § 4001.
112. See Authorizations of Use of Force: Administration Perspectives: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of
Sen. Menendez, Democratic Chair of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels.) (“In
my view it is irresponsible to keep outdated authority on the books to
address future hypothetical threats for which it was never intended”),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/authorizations-of-use-of-forceadministration-perspectives-080321 [https://perma.cc/YM2A-NFBA].
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doing no more than adding a few “accountability strings” risks
underestimating key real-world impact of legal attention to detention
practices post-9/11. Among others, legal limitations and other burdens
associated with those AUMF-based detentions have remained
significant enough that no U.S. President has seen fit to bring any new
prisoners to Guantánamo Bay since 2008.113 And the U.S. military has
been gradually extricating itself from post-9/11 detention operations
ever since.114
Moyn’s argument, that the U.S. embrace of humanitarian legal
restrictions prolonged U.S. participation in the post-9/11 wars (by
tamping down otherwise change-producing public outrage about war’s
violence),115 is even less persuasive. As a matter of causation, the
relative lack of any popular uprising in the United States against our
prolonged post-9/11 wars is radically overdetermined. Indeed, it has
been easy for Americans to live in near total ignorance of war’s
existence, much less human cost. Across all three presidential debates
during the 2020 election campaign, for example, no candidate fielded a
single question about Afghanistan.116 For eighteen years (including the
first eight years after 9/11), Department of Defense policy prohibited
all media coverage of the return of fallen soldiers to U.S. soil.117 Neither
is there much occasion for the vast majority of Americans to come into
contact with members of the military at all. Today, fewer than one half

113. Sarah Almukhtar et al., The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 14,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/guantanamo-baydetainees.html [https://perma.cc/3DUT-VQZ4].
114. See, e.g., Thomas Gibbons-Neff et al., Pentagon Accelerates Withdrawal
from Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/05/25/us/politics/us-afghanistan-withdrawal.html [https://perma.cc/
3XK8-PV3L]; Jane Arraf & Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Announce Troop
Drawdown from Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2021/07/24/world/middleeast/iraq-biden-us-forces.html [https://perma.
cc/6W4Q-SUQV].
115. See MOYN, supra note 109, at 252–55.
116. Bonnie Kristian, The U.S. Has Little to Show for 2 Decades of War in
Afghanistan: Not Even a Mention at the Presidential Debates, BUS. INSIDER
(Oct. 28, 2020, 10:08 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/no-mentionof-us-wars-at-biden-trump-presidential-debates-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/
5MDV-METW].
117. Obama Administration Lifts Blanket Ban on Media Coverage of the Return
of Fallen Soldiers, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Feb. 26, 2009), https://nsarchive2.
gwu.edu/news/20090226/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC96-VF2V]; CRISIS
COORDINATION CTR., OFF. OF THE SEC. OF DEF., PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE:
OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTY AND MORTUARY AFFAIRS (1991).
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of one percent of Americans serve in the U.S. Armed Forces.118 More,
even if Americans had been paying closer (or any) attention, post-9/11
metrics of public opinion make it far from apparent that a war of
greater brutality would have triggered greater public hostility. In the
first decade after the attacks, one of the most popular shows on
television was “24,” a weekly celebration of the effectiveness of torture
as an essential interrogation device in responding to the perennial
“ticking bomb” to be disarmed.119 More recent opinion polls continue to
show that the public is roughly evenly divided on whether it is ever
acceptable for the country to use torture in interrogation.120
While these examples may thus offer particularly weak support for
the notion that certain legal positions can help legitimate, rather than
curtail, problematic State policy, these scholars nonetheless do the
academic study of international law a favor by focusing on the extent
to which legal rules and incentives operate not simply by shaping State
decision-making writ large, but by shaping decision-making by
particular individual officials charged with conducting affairs of State.
Moyn may well be faulted for failing to substantiate his hypothesis that
legal commitments to end torture and minimize civilian casualties made
it psychologically easier for members of the Obama Administration to
support the continued use of force (it would of course be profoundly
concerning were the effect otherwise).121 But he is right to insist that
lawyers recognize their capacity to influence the individuals who are
guided by their counsel. Indeed, a more empirically oriented inspection
of this form of influence, considered below, raises the prospect that legal
analysis may not only be capable of legitimating moral or policy choice,
but of effectively supplanting it.
118. Demographics of the U.S. Military, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (July 13,
2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-mil
itary [https://perma.cc/TP9H-JYMN].
119. See 24, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0285331/ [https://perma.
cc/R3M2-CSV5]; see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 84, at 143 (discussing
the “ticking bomb” scenario, a hypothetical situation where a bomb has
been activated and the only person who may have information to prevent
or minimize the potential damage from an explosion of the bomb is the
suspect, who refuses to disclose this information).
120. Alec Tyson, Americans Divided in Views of Use of Torture in U.S. AntiTerror Efforts, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.pewresearc
h.org/fact-tank/2017/01/26/americans-divided-in-views-of-use-of-torturein-u-s-anti-terror-efforts/ [https://perma.cc/Z6B2-XZ6D].
121. Indeed, hypothesizing that efforts to adhere to procedures aimed at limiting
civilian casualties gave war leaders psychological comfort is far different
from arguing that policy makers thought compliance with humanitarian
rules was necessary or sufficient cause for the use of military force in the
first instance, or that such limits led leaders to prolong a war they otherwise
believed to be without independent moral or political justification.
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C. Law as Moral Avoidance

Accounts of the Obama Administration national security process
invariably describe internal administration debates as “lawyerly,”
perhaps an unsurprising consequence of an administration in which the
President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and many other senior
policy advisors all held law degrees.122 That professional ethos clearly
brought some advantages, including a commitment to a regularized
decision-making process that considered the views of competing voices
inside the Executive Branch.123 It is also perhaps unavoidable in such
circumstances that legal counsel and substantive legal requirements end
up organizing and setting the “framework” for policy discussion, as
policy-makers anticipate having to justify their actions to Congress, the
courts, and the general public.124 Yet while it is neither surprising nor
necessarily problematic that law should come in this way to “suffuse
the basic process of [policy] choice,”125 the post-9/11 years raised the
prospect that exclusive or overly myopic attention to legality might
come to eclipse or even supplant policy makers’ attention to an action’s
moral, strategic, or practical advisability.
Consider two anecdotes from a qualitative study I undertook,
surveying senior national security policy officials who served in the
Bush and Obama Administrations between 2001–2017.126 As one senior
Bush Administration official described, in internal decision-making
about whether or not to adhere to the Geneva Conventions in the early
years after 9/11, counsel would often develop legal guidance in relative
isolation from agency policy officials, a practice the official
characterized as a “disaster.”127 Lawyers’ “perspective on these issues is
almost always narrower than the national interest writ large,” the
official noted.128 “The lawyers were asking, ‘what can we do to give the
President flexibility?’ And presidential flexibility is an important idea.
But there are broader interests here.”129 In this account, the early
bureaucratic disconnect between lawyers and the range of
administration policy makers helped facilitate the embrace of options
122. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY
65 (2015).
123. Id. at 66–67.
124. Pearlstein, supra note 43 (manuscript at 4, 7).
125. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 103 (“The requirement of justification suffuses the
basic process of choice.”).
126. Pearlstein, supra note 43 (manuscript at 2, 12).
127. Id. at 37–38.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 38.
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that lawyers stretched to deem legal, even when key members of the
policy team would have rejected them on policy grounds as insensible.
By contrast, accounts of Obama Administration decision-making
describe lawyers as integrated at every stage of the policy-making
process, so much so that senior policy makers themselves began
internalizing a legal-analytical approach. “You end up having operators
who never went to law school, but the legal issues keep recurring and
so they get used to them and even raise them themselves,” noted one
interviewee.130 So it was that in identifying examples in which legal rules
changed policy outcomes, four separate administration policy decisionmakers cited the President’s decision not to use military force against
Syria following that country’s 2013 use of chemical weapons.131 The
President decided against the use of force, in this account, in substantial
measure because legal counsel were not convinced such an attack would
be lawful. In one sense, this is indeed an important example of law (or
at least, lawyers) functioning as an effective constraint on power. Yet
a fifth official, also directly involved in decision-making, suggested a
different reading.132 Noting that the President had a range of concerns
about the wisdom of a U.S. military intervention in Syria at that time,
the official suggested the law might have served in that instance as
more of “an off ramp” for an action the President was, that official
believed, disinclined to take under any circumstances. That it
nonetheless seemed to take a legal analysis—indeed, an unusual legal
analysis capable of producing a conclusive “no” in a field in which the
law is rife with shades of gray—to settle the presidential decision raises
a different question. Had the lawyers approved, would the President
have been more likely to pursue military action, notwithstanding deep
policy reservations about its wisdom?
It is easy to see why the application of international law to the
complex questions of the post-9/11 wars could so wholly capture the
interest of lawyers, teachers, and policy makers alike, as the accounts
of internal deliberation, and the explosion of external writing on the
subject made clear.133 The law that exists in the field is intricate and
challenging to master. Legal counsel and legal academics seem
especially knowledgeable and authoritative about its effects, and the
law in general seems reassuringly concrete to reporters struggling to
make sense of shifting policy, and to policy makers who, in the fog of
war, are constantly compelled to make impossibly weighty decisions
based on imperfect information about life and death. The law can seem
130. SAVAGE, supra note 122 at 66 (quoting Lisa Monaco, Homeland Security
Advisor to President Obama).
131. Pearlstein, supra note 43 (manuscript at 19).
132. Id. at 43.
133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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like a lifeline of relative clarity in a universe of chronic ambiguity. For
no matter how much ambiguity the law itself contains, the relatively
formal task of legal interpretation is still easier and more cabined than
the far more free-form task of exercising integrated moral and political
judgment. It is always easier to answer questions about what is legal
than it is to answer questions about whether some action is good idea.
Yet pace Lieber—who hoped that “the laws of war provided a
framework for ethical decision making”134—it is a mistake to imagine
that analysis of an action’s legality can stand in for an assessment of
its moral, strategic, or practical advisability. Indeed, it was the West
Point Lieber Institute itself that recently published an essay
emphasizing that “[t]he law of armed conflict was not designed to serve
as a comprehensive normative framework for debating the rights and
wrongs of war.”135 The law of armed conflict does not distinguish, for
example, between the relative justness of the cause of the warring
parties—but policy makers certainly should. The law of armed conflict
likewise categorically tolerates the loss of innocent, civilian life in
certain circumstances. Yet while it is easy to conclude that some such
losses are legal, policy makers will make better decisions if they
nonetheless ensure their framework for decision-making equally requires
that they internalize the independent moral and political costs. Indeed,
even when the law itself requires a greater range of moral
considerations, law speaks in a language that makes it possible to keep
the real costs of decision-making comfortably abstract, far removed
from the lived experience of war.136 Legal guidance in war—whether
lawyer to client, or scholar to public—should take care to emphasize
that the question of what the law permits not function to settle the
question of what States should do.

IV. Conclusion
It is entirely necessary and appropriate that legal academics—as
scholars and lawyers—engage in the technical work of studying,
evaluating, and applying the law. It is indispensable to providing
specific and meaningful guidance to warriors, and to exposing the gaps
in the law that remain. But it is a mistake for academics or lawyers—
and especially for academics who are lawyers—to foster a view that
134. WITT, supra note 1, at 368 (describing Lincoln’s internal deliberations in
1862).
135. Aurel Sari, Israeli Attacks on Gaza’s Tower Blocks, LIEBER INST. FOR L.
& WARFARE (May 17, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/israeli-attacksgazas-tower-blocks/ [https://perma.cc/R2EJ-YTDR].
136. See Naz K. Modirzadeh, Cut These Words: Passion and International
Law of War Scholarship, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 53 (2020).
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legal analysis raises or can answer all wartime questions, or can absolve
policy makers from the burden of grappling with the practical, entirely
concrete, consequences of their decisions. It is equally a mistake to
assert the law makes clear more than it does. In addition to instructing
policy makers on what the law is, legal academics can play a critical
role in cautioning policy makers about the limits of legal reasoning as
a tool for human decision-making when, as will continue to happen in
the years ahead, the law alone is not enough.
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